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CONGRESS PASSES THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
Neil S. Lang and Sarah B. Estes*
[Note to Readers: This article was written shortly after the enactment
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Since such time, the Securities and
Exchange Commission has proposed rules to implement certain provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Some of these proposed rules
2
are open and are subject to comment.1 Others have become effective.
3
Others have yet to be proposed.
In many cases, the proposed and final rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission go well beyond the statutory mandate in
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission created the new term "disclosure controls and procedures" in connection with the certification requirements of section 302 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and the concept of a "noisy-withdrawal"
in connection with the professional conduct for attorneys requirement of
section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
In addition, the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ have proposed listing-rules to comply with the requirements of section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Such
proposed listing-rules are subject to comment and approval by the Securities and Exchange Commission. As a result, you should review such proposed and final rules to get the full flavor of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 in its current form.]

ON

I.

INTRODUCTION

July 30, 2002, President George W. Bush signed into law the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the Act). 4 The Act was passed in
response to nationwide concerns regarding corporate misconduct and the role that accountants may have played (in some instances) in
* Partners, Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, Washington, DC and Atlanta, GA.
1. The Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed rules to implement sections 301, 303(a), 403(a)(4) and 404.
2. The Securities and Exchange Commission has adopted final rules to implement
sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 206, 302, 306(a), 307, 401(a), 401(b), 403(a)(1) through
(3), 406, 407, 409 and 802.
3. The Securities and Exchange Commission has yet to propose rules to implement
sections 409 (although the Securities and Commission has adopted rules pursuant
to this section, it is likely that it will adopt other rules relating to real-time disclosure by public companies) and 501.
4. Sabarnes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7201.
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facilitating such misconduct. The new law significantly alters corporate
and accounting requirements in six important areas: (1) auditor oversight,
(2) auditor independence, (3) corporate responsibility, (4) financial disclosures, (5) analyst conflicts of interest, and (6) civil and criminal penalties for fraud. The most significant provisions in each area are
summarized below.
A.

AUDITOR OVERSIGHT

The Act provides for federal regulation of the public accounting profession through the newly created Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (the Board). The Securities and Exchange Commission (the Commission) has "oversight and enforcement authority over the Board," similar to the authority of the Commission over other securities selfregulatory organizations. 5 Significant provisions include:
Establishment of the Board: The Board, which must be fully operational within 270 days after enactment of the Act, will have five members
appointed by the Commission. 6 Only two of the five members can be
7
accountants.
Mandatory registration: All public accounting firms that prepare audit
reports for publicly traded companies are required to register with the
Board within 180 days after the Commission determines that the Board is
8
fully operational.
Board sets accounting standards: The Act requires the Board to establish the standards to be used in audits of public companies. 9 Specifically,
the Board is charged with adopting "auditing and related attestation standards, [ ] quality control standards, and [ ] ethics standards ..... 10sThe
Board may adopt standards proposed by the accounting industry and is
directed to cooperate with industry representatives in setting standards."
Inspections of accounting firms: The Board will conduct inspections of
each registered public accounting firm to assess compliance with the
Act. 12 Firms that perform audits for more than 100 public companies per
year will be inspected annually; 13 other firms will be inspected at least
every three years. 14 The Board's inspection reports will be provided to
the Commission and to state regulators; 15 furthermore, at least parts of
16
the reports will be made public.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

§ 107(a).
§ 101(d), (e)(1).
§ 101(e)(2).
§ 102(a).
§ 103(a)(1).
§ 103(a)(2).
§ 103(a)(3)(A)(i).
§ 104(a).
§ 104(b)(1)(A).

14. § 104(b)(1)(B).
15. § 104(g)(1).
16. § 104(g)(2).
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Investigations: The Board will conduct investigations of accounting
firms and their associated persons as to potential violations of: the Act;
the rules of the Board; the federal securities laws dealing with accounting;
the rules of the Commission; and professional standards. 17 The Board
will have the power to compel accountants, their clients, or "any other
person" to give testimony and produce audit workpapers and other documents.1 8 Accounting firms or their associated persons who refuse to cooperate in investigations will be subject to sanctions by the Board, 19
including having their registration with the Board suspended or revoked. 20 If needed, the Board can apply to the Commission for issuance
of subpoenas, which may be directed to "any person. '2 1 "The Board [is
directed to] notify the Commission of [ ] investigation[s] ...[of] potential
violation[s] of the [federal] securities laws, and thereafter coordinate its
[activities] with [those of] the 'Commission's Division of
'22
Enforcement'.
Disciplinary proceedings and sanctions: The Board will conduct disciplinary proceedings "to determine whether a registered public accounting
firm," or an individual associated with the firm, 23 has violated the "Act,
'24
the securities laws, the rules of the Board, or professional standards.
The Board is authorized to sanction violators, including:
Suspend or revoke an accounting firm's or individual's registration with
the Board (effectively preventing them from auditing public companies); 25 Limit the activities, functions or operations of the registered firm
or individual; 26 Impose civil monetary penalties of up to $100,000 for an
individual, and $2,000,000 for a firm, but with provisions for higher penalties ($750,000 for an individual, and $15,000,000 for a firm) if the violation is intentional, knowing, reckless, or a repeated instance of
negligence; 27 Censure a registered accounting firm or individual; 28 Require additional training; 29 and Impose other sanctions as deemed
30
appropriate.
Suspensions, revocations, limitations of activities, and imposition of the
higher levels of monetary penalties require a finding that there was "intentional or knowing conduct," "reckless conduct" 3 1 or "repeated in17. § 105(b)(1).
18. § 105(b)(2)(A-C).

19. § 105(b)(3).
20. § 105(b)(3)(i),(ii).
21. § 105(b)(2)(D).
22. § 105(b)(4)(A).

23. § 105(c)(1).
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§

105(c)(3)(B).
105(c)(4)(A),(B).
105(c)(4)(C).
105(c)(4)(D)(i),(ii).
105(c)(4)(E).
105(c)(4)(F).
105(c)(4)(G).
105(c)(5)(A).
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stances of negligent conduct. '32 The Board may also impose sanctions
for33 a public accounting firm's failure to supervise those associated with
it. Final disciplinary sanctions can be appealed to the Commission for
review.

34

Act applies to foreign public accounting firms: The Act provides that
"[a]ny foreign public accounting firm that prepares [ ] furnishes" ...35
[or] "plays such a substantial role" 36 with respect to an audit report for a
public company shall be subject to the Act, the rules of the Board, and
the rules of the Commission, to the same extent as a domestic accounting
37
firm (unless the Commission or the Board exempts the foreign firm.)
Foreign accounting firms must produce audit workpapers in connection
with any investigation by the Board or the Commission, 38 and the U.S.
Federal courts have jurisdiction to enforce requests for production of
39
those documents.
Study of principles-based accounting: In addition to the Board's authority to set accounting standards, the Act also provides that "the Commission may recognize, as 'generally accepted' for purposes of the
securities laws, any accounting principles established by a standard-setting body."' 40 The Commission is further charged with conducting a
study, to be completed within one year of enactment of the Act, on the
adoption of a "principles-based
[as opposed to a rules-based] accounting
41
system" in the United States.
Funding of the Board: The Board's budget will be funded by the registration fees paid by accounting firms and also by "accounting support
fees" which will be assessed against publicly traded companies in an allocation based on their equity market capitalization. 42 "[M]onetary penalties [collected by the Board will] fund a merit scholarship program" for
students seeking accounting degrees, which program the Board is to
43
administer.
B.

AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE

The Act attempts to ensure auditor independence by prohibiting accounting firms from providing non-audit services to the public companies
they audit. 4 4 Significant provisions include:
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

§ 105(c)(5)(B).
§ 105(c)(6).
See §§ 105(e), 107(c)(2).
§ 106(a)(1).
§ 106(a)(2).

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

§ 106.
§ 106(b), (b)(1)(A).
§ 106(b)(1)(B).
§ 108(b)(1).
§ 108(d)(1)(A), (d)(2).

42. § 109(c)(1).
43. § 109(c)(2).
44. § 201(g).
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Non-audit services prohibited: Registered public accounting firms
(those auditing public companies) are prohibited from performing a variety of specified "non-audit services" including: "bookkeeping; ' 45 "financial information systems design and implementation; ' 46 "appraisal or
'47
opinions or contribution-in-kind reports;
valuation services; fairness
'48
"actuarial services;" "internal audit outsourcing services; ' 49 "management functions or human resources; ' 50 "broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services;" 51 and "legal services and expert
services unrelated to the audit."5 2z An "accounting firm may engage in
any non-audit service, including tax services, [that are not specifically
banned, but ] only if [such services
are] approved in advance" by the pub53
lic company's audit committee.
Rotation of audit partners: Accounting firms must rotate the lead audit
partner and the audit partner responsible for reviewing the audit for each
54
public company client at least every five years.
Cooling-off period if auditors join management: An accounting firm is
prohibited from auditing a public company if a current member of senior
management of the company (CEO, CFO, controller, chief accounting
officer, or person holding an equivalent position) was previously employed by the accounting firm and participated in the public company's
55
audit during the previous year.
Study on rotation of accounting firms: The Act mandates a study by the
Comptroller General to determine whether there should also be a fiveyear limit on the period of time an accounting firm may serve as the audi56
tor for a particular public company.
C.

CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY

The Act attempts to impose greater responsibility on corporations by
holding their officers and directors personally accountable and by toughening disclosure requirements. Significant provisions include:
Audit committee independence and oversight: The audit committee of
57
a public company must be comprised solely of independent directors.
The audit committee is directly responsible for hiring, compensating and
overseeing the work of the outside public accounting firm that audits the
company, and the audit committee must resolve any disagreements be45. § 201(g)(1).
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

§201(g)(2).
§201(g)(3).
§201(g)(4).
§201(g)(5).
§201(g)(6).

51. §201(g)(7).
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

§201(g)(8).
§201(h).
§201(j).
§ 206.
§ 207.
§ 301(m).
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tween the auditors and company management. 58 The company must adequately fund the audit committee to pay the auditing firm and any
independent legal counsel or other advisors the committee hires. 59 Any
publicly traded company that fails to comply with these requirements will
securihave its stock de-listed from a national stock exchange or national
60
ties association (such as the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ).
Management must certify 10-K and 10-Q reports: Section 302(a) of the
Act states that CEOs and CFOs of public companies are required to certify each annual and quarterly report filed with the Commission, certifying the following:
The "officer has reviewed the report; ' 61 "[B]ased on the officer's
knowledge the report does not contain" any material misstatements or
omissions;62 "[Biased on such officer's knowledge the financial statements

. .

. "fairly present ...

the financial condition and results of opera-

tions" of the company in all material respects; 63 The officer is responsible
for establishing internal controls designed to ensure that the officer receives all material information, and the officer has evaluated such controls within the last ninety days; 64 The officer has disclosed to the outside
auditors and the audit committee significant deficiencies in the internal
controls, 65 and any fraud that involves management or employees having
a role in the internal controls; 66 and The report indicates whether there
have been "significant changes in [the] internal controls or [ ] other factors that could" affect them, since management's last evaluation of the
67
controls.
The Commission must adopt rules within thirty days to implement the
certification provision. 68 The Act expressly provides that a company cannot escape this provision by reincorporating or changing its domicile to a
foreign country.

69

Executive interference with audits outlawed: The Act makes it unlawful
for any officer, director or person acting at their direction "to fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or mislead" an accountant conducting an audit of the company's financial statements. 70 The
Commission, which is given exclusive authority to enforce this provision,
71
is charged with proposing rules within ninety days for this purpose.
Bonuses forfeited upon restatements: If a public company is required
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

§ 301(m)(2).
§ 301(m)(6)(A),(B).
§ 301(m)(1)(A).
§ 302(a)(1).
§ 302(a)(2).
§ 302(a)(3).

64. § 302(a)(4)(A-C).

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

§ 302(a)(5)(A).
§ 302(a)(5)(B).
§ 302(a)(5)(B), (a)(6).
§ 302(c).
§ 302(b).
§ 303(a).
§ 303(b),(d)(1).
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to restate its financial statements "as a result of misconduct", 72 then the
CEO and CFO must reimburse the company for "any bonus or other
incentive-based . . . compensation" paid to them during the twelvemonth period following the improper reporting. 7 3 The CEO and CFO
must also forfeit to the company any profits they have realized from the
sale of the company's stock or other securities during that twelve-month
74
period.
Standard for bars of officers and directors lowered to unfitness: The
Act lowers the standard for barring an individual from serving as an officer or director of a public company from "substantial unfitness" (the old
standard) to the presumably lower standard of mere "unfitness. '75 (The
Commission in federal District Court still must bring such actions; the
Act did not give the Commission the power to bring these as administra76
tive proceedings.)
Executives may not trade during pension fund "blackouts": Officers
and directors of a public company are prohibited from trading in the
company's stock during a pension fund "blackout" period when the plan
participants' ability to trade is suspended. 77 If they do, any profits they
realize are recoverable by the company. The pension plan administrator
must give plan participants at least thirty days advance notice of a black78
out period.
Lawyers as whistleblowers: The Act requires an attorney representing a
public company "to report evidence of a material violation of securities
law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation[s] by [or within] the
company to the chief legal counsel or chief executive officer of the company."'79 If those officers do not "appropriately respond," the attorney
must "report the evidence to the audit committee" or other committee
comprised solely of outside directors.8 0 However, the Act does not specify what happens if the committee does not appropriately respond. The
Commission is directed to issue rules within 180 days to implement this
provision of the Act. 81 The rules will apply to any attorney who practices
before the Commission in any way.
Victim relief fund for investors: In any action where the Commission
obtains both disgorgement of ill-gotten gains and civil monetary penalties, the penalties will be added to a "disgorgement fund for the benefit of
victims" of the securities law violations. 82 The Commission is also authorized to accept gifts, bequests and other donations to the disgorge72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

§ 304(a).
§ 304(a)(1).
§ 304(a)(2).
§ 305(a)(1).
§ 305(b).
§ 306(a)(1).
§. 306(b)(1)(i)(2)(B).
§. 307(1).
§. 307(2).
§ 307.

82. § 308(a).
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83
ment fund.

D.

ENHANCED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES BY PUBLIC COMPANIES

The Act requires enhanced financial disclosures designed to increase
the transparency of public companies' financial statements. Significant
provisions include:
Off-balance sheet transactions and "pro forma" statements: The Act
mandates the Commission to issue rules, within 180 days, to require the
public financial filings of public companies to reflect "off-balance sheet
transactions, arrangements, [and] obligations.., that may have a material
...effect" on the company's financial condition, either currently or in
the future. 84 In addition, such financial filings must immediately reflect
any "material correcting adjustments" identified by the company's auditor.85 Finally, any "pro forma" figures included in a public filing or "any
public disclosure" (such as a press release) are required to be presented
in a manner that is not misleading, and which "reconciles" the pro forma
figures with the company's financial statements according to generally ac86
cepted accounting principles.
Study of special purpose entities and off-balance sheet arrangements:
The Commission is directed to conduct a study on the extent to which
public companies use off-balance sheet transactions and "special purpose
entities" (SPEs), to consider whether generally accepted accounting rules
are adequate to account for such transactions in a "transparent fashion,"
and to make recommendations to improve the financial reporting of such
87
transactions.
Personal loans to executives banned: Public companies are prohibited
88
from extending personal loans to their officers and directors.
Disclosure period shortened for insider transactions: The Act shortens
the deadline for principal stockholders, directors and senior executives to
disclose changes in ownership of their company's securities or securitybased swap agreements to two business days after the change occurs (reduced from the previous requirement of ten days after the close of the
89
calendar month).
Annual reports must assess "internal controls": The Commission is directed to issue rules requiring public companies to include, as part of
their annual report, an assessment of the company's "internal control
structure and procedures for financial reporting." 90 The company's public auditor must "attest to, and report on," management's assessment as
83. §308(b).
84.
85.
86.

§ 401(a)(j).
§401(a)(k).
§ 401(b).

87. § 401(c)(1),(2).
88. § 402(k)(1).
89. § 403(a)(2)(C).
90.

§ 404(a)(2).
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part of the audit engagement. 9 1
Corporate code of ethics required: The Act requires each public company to have a code of ethics for its senior financial officers or to explain
why it does not have one. 92 Any changes in the code of ethics must be
is required to issue
disclosed promptly on Form 8-K. 93 The Commission
94
rules within ninety days concerning this provision.
Audit committee financial expert: The Act requires a public company
to disclose whether "at least 1 member ... [of its audit committee] is a

financial expert" (and if not, the reasons why its audit committee does
not have at least one member who is a financial expert). 95 The Commission is required to issue rules within ninety days concerning this
96
provision.
Enhanced review of public companies: The Act mandates that the
Commission review the 10-K and other periodic filings of all public companies at least once every three years. 97 In scheduling the reviews, the
Commission is expressly directed to consider certain factors, including:
Companies that have restated their financial results; 98 Companies
whose stock has experienced significant volatility; 99 Companies "with the
largest market capitalization;"' 0 0 "[E]merging companies with disparities
operations
in [their] price-to-earnings ratios;"' 1 1 and Companies "whose
02
significantly affect a material sector of the economy."'
Real time financial disclosure required: The Act requires public companies to "disclose ...on a rapid and current basis ... material changes [in

the company's] financial condition or operations 10in3 plain English
according to rules that the Commission will issue.
E.

. .

SECURITIES ANALYST CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Within one year, the Commission must promulgate rules designed to
address conflicts of interest between securities analysts and investment
bankers working at the same firm. 10 4 Some of the rule provisions re-

quired by the Act include:
91.

§ 404(b).

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

§ 406(a).
§ 406(b).
§ 406(d)(1).
§ 407(a).
§ 407(c)(1).
§ 408.
§ 408(b)(1).
§ 408(b)(2).

100. § 408(b)(3).
101.
102.
103.

§ 408(b)(4).
§ 408(b)(5).
§ 409(1).

104. § 501. The Act makes no mention of the analyst conflict of interest rules recently
enacted by the securities self-regulatory organizations (the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)) and approved by the Commission.

30

LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS

[Vol. 9

Preapproval of research reports banned: "Prepublication clearance or
approval of [analyst] research reports" by the investment banking arm of
10 5
a broker/dealer is prohibited.
Supervision of analysts: Analysts cannot be supervised, nor can their
compensation be evaluated, by those engaged in the investment banking
10 6
activities of the firm.
Analysts protected from retaliation: Analysts who publish negative research reports must be protected from retaliation by their employers, or
by individuals employed in the investment-banking arm of the firm. 10 7
Disclosure of conflicts of interest mandated: Analysts must make disclosures of conflicts of interest during public appearances and in all research reports, including such matters as whether the analyst or his
broker/dealer has an investment in the securities of, or has received compensation from, any public company whose securities are being
108
reviewed.
F.

CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR FRAUD AND DOCUMENT

D ESTRUCTION

The Act includes several provisions designed to apply the tough-oncrime principle to various securities and white-collar crime violations.
Significant provisions include:
Stiff sentences for document destruction: The Act provides for fines
and prison sentences of up to twenty years for the "[d]estruction, alteration or falsification of records in [order to impede] Federal investigations
and bankruptc[ies.] 10 9 Ten-year prison sentences and fines are authorized
for accountants who fail to maintain audit workpapers for the prescribed
time period (five years).' 0
Non-dischargability in bankruptcy: Debts, which are the result of
claims based on violations of the federal securities laws or common law
fraud, are not dischargeable in bankruptcy."'
Statute of limitations extended for civil claims: The statute of limitations for private (civil) fraud claims under the federal securities laws is
extended to the earlier of two years after the discovery of the violation
(previously it was one year), or five years after such violation occurred
112
(previously it was three years).
Protection for whistleblowers: The Act includes provisions to protect
whistleblowers (employees of public companies who report information
concerning possible instances of securities fraud) from retaliation by the
105.
106.
107.

§ 501(a)(1)(A).
§ 501(a)(1)(B).
§ 501(a)(1)(C).

108. § 501(b)(1-5).
109.
110.
111.
112.

§ 802(a).
§ 802(a-c).
§ 803.
§ 804(b)(1),(2).
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company." 3
New crime of "securities fraud" created: The Act creates the new crime
of securities fraud, making it illegal to "knowingly... defraud any person
in connection with any security [of a publicly traded company]; or obtain
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,
any money or property in connection with the purchase or sale . . ." of
such securities. 114 The penalty for the crime of securities
fraud is impris11 5
onment of up to twenty-five years, a fine, or both.
Stiffer sentences for white-collar crimes: The Act also establishes and/
or increases penalties for various white-collar crimes, including:
Mail and wire fraud (prison terms increased from five years to twenty
years);11 6 ERISA violations (fines increased to a range of $100,000 to
$500,000, and prison terms increased from one year to ten years); 117 Tampering with, destroying or concealing a record or otherwise impeding or
obstructing "any official proceeding" (fines, prison terms of twenty years,
or both)." 8
Criminal penalties for management's certification: The Act imposes
criminal penalties for anyone who certifies a periodic report filed with the
Commission by a public company knowing that the report does not comply with the certification requirements (imposing fines up to $1,000,000
and prison terms up to ten years for "knowing" violations), 1 19 or who
willfully certifies a report that does not comply (imposing fines up to
$5,000,000 and prison terms up to twenty years for "willful" violations). 120 Unlike the certification required by section 302, which is effective only after the SEC adopts rules, this certification is effective
immediately and will be required for all periodic reports containing finan2
cial statements filed after enactment.' '
II.

CONCLUSION

In summary, much of the impact of the Act will depend on the many
rules and regulations that the Securities and Exchange Commission is
charged with issuing over the course of the next year, and how effectively
the Commission can enforce those rules in the future. It will also depend
on the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's ability to design
and create the infrastructure needed to implement the Act's provisions
concerning the accounting profession, and the many rules and regulations
that must be issued to carry out the Board's mandate.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

§ 806.
§ 807(a).
§ 807.
§ 903(a),(b).
§ 904(1-3).
§ 1102(c)(1),(2).
906(c)(1).
906(c)(2).
§ 906(a).
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